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Abstract. This article describes some negative consequences of an intelligence analyst from Country A 
providing classified information to allied Country B in an unauthorized fashion.  
 
Near the end of the negotiations at the Wye Plantation Summit, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin 
Netanyahu requested that United States (U.S.) President Clinton release Jonathan Jay Pollard. Pollard 
has been incarcerated after being convicted of espionage--viz., passing top-secret U.S. documents to 
Israel.  
 
Many of Pollard's U.S. supporters who advocate his release emphasize that Pollard only provided 
classified information relevant to Israel's national survival and that Israel has been a stalwart U.S. ally. 
These two factors are assumed to be extenuating factors that should mitigate the need for further 
incarceration.  
 
However, Pollard's supporters are grossly misreading the nature of the intelligence world. To the Israeli 
Government, Israel's survival is paramount. If Israel's survival needs are judged by the Israeli 
Government to be incompatible in specific or general cases with the security of the US, the Israeli 
Government will act contrary to U.S. interests--and from the Israeli perspective, rightly so. There are 
already historical examples of this incompatibility going back at least as far as the 1967 War--when U.S. 
Navy personnel were killed by an Israeli air attack--and as recently as the Israeli Government's refusal to 
share what Pollard provided with the U.S. Government so the latter can engage in an adequate damage 
assessment. It has worked the other way, too. Historical examples include U.S. political positions on 
Mideast peace that have been contrary to those of Israel and U.S. political pressures on Israel to cease 
and desist from various military, paramilitary, and intelligence operations--e.g., not entering Beirut with 
significant military force during Operation Peace for Galilee. In fact, both sides--the US and Israel--most 
probably have passed sensitive information obtained from each other about each other or others to 
other governments and still other political entities. Thus, besides the obvious potential point of allies 
becoming long-term neutrals or adversaries, even allies may find themselves at cross-purposes in an 
otherwise friendly relationship.  
 
Even if Israel and the US remained the closest of allies, the Israeli Government--like any government--
has almost certainly been penetrated in varying degrees by other governments and political entities--
including the US. Penetration may involve loose Israeli analytic and operational procedures and 
mistakes, the subversion of Israeli intelligence personnel, the characteristics of technical intelligence 
means, and moles. Even an Israeli Government intent to closely guard U.S. information would not 
necessarily lead to that information's protection--a fact that might facilitate U.S. deception operations 
against Israel or through Israel to a third party but that also might facilitate security damage to the US.  
 
Releasing Pollard also would have adverse morale and other motivational effects on U.S. personnel 
security and counterintelligence personnel entrusted to catch spies, all intelligence personnel entrusted 
not to commit espionage, and the rule of law--tempered by human judgment--entrusted to be a vehicle 
of trust and cohesion among all U.S. citizens. Given the huge amount of classified information 
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purportedly passed by Pollard to the Israelis, damage done to U.S. security has surely been and 
continues to be inevitable and most likely significant. In fact, releasing Pollard may ultimately be in 
neither the interest of the US nor Israel--regardless of Netanyahu's public protestations to the contrary. 
(See Crino, M.D. (1994). Employee sabotage: A random or preventable phenomenon. Journal of 
Managerial Issues, 6, 311-330; DeMarrais, E., Castillo, L.J., & earle, T. (1996). Ideology, materialization, 
and power strategies. Current Anthropology, 37, 47-86; Honts, C.R. (1992). Counterintelligence Scope 
polygraph (CSP) test found to be poor discriminator. Forensic Reports, 5, 215-218; Lothane, Z. (1997). 
Omnipotence or the delusional aspect of ideology in relation to love, power, and group dynamics. 
American Journal of Psychoanalysis, 57, 25-46; Newstrom, J.W., Reif, W.E., & Monczka, R.M. (1976). 
Motivating the public employee: Fact vs. fiction. Public Personnel Management, 5, 67-72; Risen, J., & 
Erlanger, S. (November 11, 1998). C.I.A. chief vowed to quit if Clinton freed Israeli spy. The New York 
Times, http://www.nytimes.com; Stone, L.A. (1992). Canonical correlation between security clearance 
adjudication concerns and later motivational causes for espionage behavior. Forensic Reports, 5, 305-
316.)(Keywords: Counterintelligence, Espionage, Intelligence, Personnel Security, Israel.) 
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